La ironía crítica o los amantes de las ruinas: el esteta, el dandy y el flâneur by Garnica, Naím
Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía 52 (2017),  151-172.
Critical Irony or the Lovers of Ruins: The 
Aesthete, the Dandy and the Flâneur
Naím Garnica




This essay examines the critical character of Friedrich 
Schlegel’s Romantic irony, following its considerations and ap-
propriations by Walter Benjamin, Harold Bloom and Paul de 
Man. Likewise, it shows a parallelism of this critical attitude of 
irony with three Romantic literary figures: the aesthete, the dan-
dy and the flâneur. These figures, joined by a prophetic faith in 
art, make of irony a profession which moves between creation 
and destruction. Appropriation in the poststructuralist context 
allows us to perceive irony in such a radical incomprehension, 
developing an aesthetic pattern that operates between creation 
and annihilation. 
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El ensayo examina el carácter crítico de la ironía romántica de 
Friedrich Schlegel siguiendo las consideraciones y apropiaciones 
de Walter Benjamin, Harold Bloom y Paul de Man. También, el 
ensayo pretende mostrar el paralelismo de la actitud crítica de la 
ironía con tres figuras literarias románticas: el esteta, el dandy y 
el flâneur. Estas criaturas, unidas por una fe profética en el arte, 
hacen de la ironía una profesión que se mueve entre la creación y 
la destrucción. La apropiación en el contexto post-estructuralista 
nos permite percibir a la ironía en una incomprensión radical, 
desarrollando un patrón estético que opera entre la creación y 
la aniquilación.  
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romanticismo. 
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I
Baudelaire said that the aesthete, the dandy and the flâneur are 
musical creatures, amused by the seduction of the world’s spectacle, 
and that over them a de-realization and dissolution of contents and 
limits operate. In these creatures, irony’s critical attitude and character 
are summarized (Cfr. Givone, 2009: 182-183). These strange, sometimes 
even suspicious, beings are those whom, in the world’s spectacle, 
bear their attitude in a critical frame and question us that possibility 
of understanding of reality.1 In some way, they constitute a limit to 
understanding in general. They are, let’s say, an anti-hermeneutic 
hypothesis. Sergio Givone, in Storia della Nulla (History of Nothingness) 
points out that narcissism, mystification and pleasure for scandal are 
some of the features of the Romantic intellectual, and he highlights the 
will to mount any aesthetic enterprise. The Italian author stresses that 
such features of Romantic intellectuals lead them to act following an 
aesthetic principle which disfigures the great artistic and social ideals 
any narrative has.2 The aesthete, the dandy and the flâneur, consequently, 
through those characteristics, are custodians of the critical attitude 
buried in the break of the Western word. These figures, elaborated in 
the frame of Romanticism, according to Givone, hold the impossibility 
of that which appears as unique and unquestionable. In other words, for 
1  To go deeper into Baudelaire’s considerations on these figures, one of his 
most Romantic works can be consulted, (1922) Les Fleurs du Mal. Let us remember 
that, for the French poet, these creatures show in a certain way the crisis of the 
modern vision on ultimate moral values. Precisely in the name of those values, 
in Les Fleurs du Mal, is that Baudelaire will stand on trial in 1857. The charges 
on “offence to public morality and religion” show that the aesthetic form 
presented by the French poet starts to consider not only a profound criticism of 
modern times, but also the emergence of moral and political consequences of the 
aesthetic praxis itself. The aesthete, the dandy, and the flâneur, at last, become 
the perfect excuse to try to show, in Baudelaire’s poetry, the appearance of the 
aesthetic autonomy of those spheres that intend to dominate artistic imagination. 
However, here we do not only want to indicate some general features which 
allow to trace a parallel with the attitude of Romantic critical irony, and not so 
much detain on them. For a detailed study on these figures in Baudelaire, an old 
work from Rhodes, S. A. (1928) can be consulted. 
2  The discontinuism this idea represents for Classicism’s expectations 
might be considered.
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them, their only certainty is uncertainty, the impossibility3 of finding the 
desired object.
However, even though their critical attitude refers to the impossibility 
of having access to a universe of objects, because that impossibility is 
aesthetically experienced, these Romantic figures do not care if they risk 
emptiness or self-destruction. Their choices–so provisional in the game 
of their irony–are annihilated and scorned, secured and taken at the same 
time. In Givone’s view, they are prisoners of the dizziness produced by 
the difference, there “operate a de-realization and a dissolution of the 
specific contents that invades their social status, making them strange, 
incomprehensible beings” (Givone, 2009: 151). In some way, their 
desires without objects, the passion for absence, those unsatisfied needs, 
give way to the indeterminacy of the forms. 
In irony, as well as in these creatures, there is a passion for absence. 
They share that need that does not want to be satisfied, and they delight 
in their unsatisfaction as pleasure. Criticism, in such a sense, is an object-
less science trying to find which conditions of possibility exist, not for 
the access to knowledge, but for the conditions limiting its impossibility. 
Absence, a key trait in Romanticism, can be found in various forms, as a 
lost mistress under the nostalgic or melancholic impulse, the motherland, 
the ideal, the divine, the absolute, etc. The form of such absence is an 
ever-going indeterminacy, an ironic gesture of immortal contradiction 
that never succeeds in grasping its object. This result is not given by a 
disgrace of fate or by the tragic consequence of his acts, but because of 
his own verdict and wish, because of the indeterminacy of the forms.
Criticism says it is impossible to come across the idea of finding, 
while reading the texts or in philosophical systems, the certainty of 
any certain knowledge. In fact, the operation of ironic criticism is to 
dismount such narrative illusion. For example, Baudelaire’s critical 
approach was full of these narrative uncertainties, everything was 
to him suspiciously safe and rigorous, and everything was the focus 
3  The Italian thinker says this: “if criticism today truly identifies with the 
work of art, it is not because criticism itself is also ‘creative’, but (if at all) insofar 
as criticism is also a form of negativity. Criticism is in fact nothing other than the 
process of its own ironic self-negation: precisely a ‘self-annihilating nothing’ or a 
‘god that self-destructs,’ according to Hegel´s prophetic, if ill willed, definition” 
(Agamben, Giorgio, 1993: xvi).
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of his sardonic mistrust.4 The problem of criticism, and of the three 
figures proposed in the similarity drawn here, is knowledge, but a sort 
of cognitive relationship that reminds us of possession-dispossession 
and the pleasure for the object. In both cases, we see their unconcerned 
attitude: the more ruined the object is or the less they can possess it, 
the more pleasure it produces. The question of the distance in ironic 
criticism is capital, too. The interruption in the narrative, its shadowed 
suspension, puts a veil on the object making it stay further away in the 
self-displacing distance. However, despite its distant and estranging 
confusion, it does not abandon the construction of knowledge. That is 
why, Agamben highlights:
[…] the negativity of irony is not the provisional 
negative of dialectic, which the magic wand of sublation 
(Aufhebung) is always already in the act of transforming 
into a positive, but an absolute and irretrievable 
negativity that does not, for that, renounce knowledge 
(Agamben, 1993: xvi).
Criticism is represented in these Romantic figures when they do 
not try to find its object. The desire that moves them is a desire for 
desiring just for the sake of desiring. The pretension of this desire is 
to avoid referentiality of any particular form, thus the love for ruin. 
Authors like Harold Bloom have seen in Romanticism that desire as a 
trope disfiguring of artistic forms, understanding its radical negation 
as the true meaning of poetry and literature. Bloom identifies in irony 
a form of aggressive and transgressive reading, which allows for new 
senses in poetry and literature. These procedures of psychic defense 
represented in the tropes–in this case, irony–are the ones that enable the 
break of traditional and crystallized forms. This task is what Bloom calls 
“misreading”. Irony’s misreading faces us with the identification of the 
4  In Les Fleurs du Mal (1922) Baudelaire sometimes exchanges the figures 
of his narrative, coming back to the same uncertainty. In some way, an ironic 
effect from Romantic poetry is presented when it provokes a metamorphosis 
in the faces of the devil, for instance, displacing its images in the tropes in a 
successive manner. This would allow for the interruption of the systematic 
narrative of Classical poetry, as in the same poem the author transfigures, from 
the deformation of the tropes, the images of the narrative. On this, the following 
works can be consulted: Wright, B. (2005) and J.A. Hiddleston (2005).      
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difficulties of reading. Despite that, the American critic, without totally 
agreeing with de Man on the impossibility of reading, believes these 
difficulties end up in referring to some critical tropes of “misreading” 
or “misprision”. Bloom says this ‘de-reading’ process is similar to “the 
triumph of Romantic irony in purified form by way of the allegory of 
reading formulated by Paul de Man” (1979: 16).
In fact, Bloom himself holds his criticism is inscribed in the projects 
where the allegory of reading is a way of disintegration of the forms in 
dialectic terms (from Crates to Miller). Bloom understands that:
The breaking of form to produce meaning, as I conceive 
it, depends upon the operation of certain instances of 
language, revisionary ratios, and on certain topological 
displacements in language that intervene between 
ratios, displacements that I have been calling ‘crossings’ 
(Bloom 1979: 14).
Nevertheless, this destructive and reconstructive alternative takes a 
risk already noted by Schlegel: “The irony of irony is the fact that one 
becomes weary of it if one is offered it everywhere and all the time […]” 
(Bloom 1979: 16).
In Bloom’s analysis, the radical negativity of irony is in danger 
of converging in destructive tiredness. However, what we want to 
emphasize here is how Paul de Man’s ironic deconstruction goes beyond 
this. De Man’s procedure consists in dissolving the poetic being and 
transforming its very heart into irony. In fact, this wound is the cause 
of its poetic aggressiveness or differentiating distance.5 Contrasted 
with Bloom, Demanian deconstruction brings poetic forms to the most 
disfiguring ruin. Both authors are unique in this point. In Bloom’s 
case, the poetic process of reading and “misreading” implies three 
psychic levels of the subject: poetic narcissism, the wounded ego, and 
finally aggression. All of this can be seen in the changes undergone by 
5  Some studies written in English on early Romanticism reduce the 
viewpoints of Paul de Man, Bloom, Miller and other authors from deconstructive 
literary criticism, seeing it as a postmodern position to the interpretation of 
Romanticism. Said studies hold the impossibility of seeing in Schlegel an avant 
la lettre deconstructivist who anticipates criticism to the logocentric conception 
of language as the oppressive consequences of Modernity. As to these critiques, 
works from Jane E. Kneller (2003), and Beiser, F. (2003). 
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poetry and criticism in the history of literature; displacements are only 
produced by means of aggression. This aggression, that is, the violence 
in reading, seeks to restore narcissism, something de Man would have 
considered impossible. Bloom, however, is willing to reassert it, in order 
to avoid the radical nature of paranoid thought that protects the poet of 
being influenced: that is what acts as a shield against poetic influence, 
i.e., against the contending, agonic and conflictive process of the anxiety 
of influence.
II
The negation of irony places the object in the distance, but at the 
same time installs its renouncement, without which it couldn’t be irony. 
The form of ironic criticism is similar to an unfinished novel, where the 
assertion of unreality and of that which cannot be appropriated allows 
for the tension of the opposites. It is the theory of irony that allows for 
those weird conditions of possibility and impossibility for philosophical 
criticism. When this theory is represented, whether it is when the 
dandy masks himself, when the flâneur is reifying himself or when the 
aesthete ironizes himself, in these three cases we find very similar ways 
of doing criticism. They make of nothingness as tension–their eternal 
and perpetual, never-to-be-realized love , an assimilation means for 
experiences to be converted into a game of fantasy and fiction. It is not 
strange that Schlegel held that only poetry can criticize poetry, until it 
becomes philosophy. In his Lyceum, in the 42nd fragment, it reads: 
Philosophy is the real homeland of irony, which one 
would like to define as logical beauty: for wherever 
philosophy appears in oral or written dialogues —
and is not simply confined into rigid systems—there 
irony should be asked for and provided. And even the 
Stoics considered urbanity a virtue. Of course, there 
is also a rhetorical species of irony which, sparingly 
used, has an excellent effect, especially in polemics; 
but compared to the sublime urbanity of the Socratic 
muse, it is like the pomp of the most splendid oration 
set over against the noble style of an ancient tragedy. 
Only poetry can also reach the heights of philosophy 
in this way, and only poetry does not restrict itself to 
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isolated ironical passages, as rhetoric does. There are 
ancient and modern poems that are pervaded by the 
divine breath of irony throughout and informed by a 
truly transcendental buffoonery. Internally: the mood 
that surveys everything and rises infinitely above all 
limitations, even above its own art, virtue, or genius; 
externally, in its execution: the mimic style of an 
averagely gifted Italian buffo (Schlegel 1991: 56).
In this fragment, there is a self-parodying postulate of irony. It 
shows the critical displacement of the artist upon his work, which gives 
him a new position that takes his work to infinite potential. The constant 
contradiction between the work, the artist and their suppositions is akin 
to the principle of pleasure, and it is also found in the three aesthetics, 
that of the dandy, the flâneur and the aesthete. 
The desire for the ruins, the unfinished, the dismembered, death, 
lost objects, bears resemblance with irony’s passion of interrupting 
discourses until they have become absurd, insignificant, a pleasurable 
nothingness (e.g., Stendhal’s and Diderot’s novels, Baudelaire’s poems, 
Schlegel’s Lucinde). If we think of a specific case, as the flâneur’s, 
recuperating his attitude does not aim for a regression to a petrified 
exalted past, but to the restitution of the flâneur’s own experience as 
a “necessary critical knowledge for a rupture with the most recent 
historical configuration” (Buck-Morss, 1995: 123). The flâneur, as well 
as the irony, allows himself the contradictive blend of disperse look 
and dreamy beholding. Both have the critical need of dismounting 
meanings which seem architectonically fit together. Both annihilate and 
ruin whatever they find on their way, later to cast light on that from the 
darkness, making it be born again in their game. Paul De Man observes, 
taking Benjamin’s view that «the ironization of form consists in a 
deliberate destruction of the form» (De Man, 1996: 182). The negative 
power of the ironic parabasis (following de Man’s indefinite definition: 
“irony is the permanent parabasis of the allegory of tropes” (De Man, 
1996: 179) is, by its negative impact, destructive of the form, a critical 
instance that, from the ruins, sets another form.  
Romantic irony–now critical irony–is an act in which subject and 
object share together the same space and time that, even though it is 
fragmented, interrupted and strange, it offers an instance of knowledge. 
Trying to understand the interrupted arabesque in the novel is a sentence 
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to the prison of rationality, an ultra-hermeneutic capable of finding the 
senses through understanding. The three chosen figures are paradigmatic 
examples of this criticism style. The critical act–paraphrasing Benjamin’s 
The Concept of art criticism–is, firstly, a radical destruction of the form of 
the work of art,6 not from the focus of an analytical understanding, but 
from the profane negativity disseminated in the immanence of the work 
of art itself. Such negative force is dispersed through the work’s texture; 
it is a complete objectivation of the work up to the point that it ends up 
destroying it. Despite this, in the moment of the loss, of its disfiguring 
interruption (Wordsworth,7 Mallarmé and Hölderlin are testimonies of 
that negativity); this is recovered through the progression to the absolute 
and the infinite to where his displacement is targeted. Following the 
Hegelian scheme in its first two moments, irony is destroyed and then 
built upon its own negation. Benjamin will see in this dimension the 
paradox of constructing through a deconstruction. He highlights:
Criticism fulfills its task insofar as, with greater closure 
of reflection and more rigorous form in the work, it 
drives these the more manifoldly and intensively out of 
itself, dissolves the original reflection in one higher, and 
so continues. In this project, criticism depends on the 
germ cells of reflection, the positively formal moments 
of the work that it resolves8 into universally formal 
moments (Benjamin, 1996: 156).
6  For an extended and detailed discussion on Benjamin’s study of 
Romanticism, the compilation made by Hanssen, B. and Benjamin, A. (2002) 
can be consulted. Also, the limitations as the Kantian legacies in Benjamin’s 
Romanticism can be seen in Gasché, R. (1996).  
7  According to Julián Jiménez Heffernan, in the prologue to Paul de 
Man’s Rhetoric of Romanticism [Spanish version La retórica del Romanticismo], “the 
miracle of Wordsworth’s diction consists in that, when he enunciates his own 
poverty without any aesthetic evasion, it recovers the phenomenic world, the 
aesthetic in the rejection process” (Jiménez Hefferman, 2007: 19). 
8  Bloom, in his essay “The Breaking of Form”, when analysing Ashbery’s 
poetry, chooses to relate it with the great critic of the Sublime in the 20th century: 
Walter Benjamin. He tags Benjamin as the precursor of deconstruction, before de 
Man or Derrida. Ashbery’s expression “Perhaps an angel looks like everything” 
entices Bloom to see in this Benjamin’s angel when he says “The angel, however, 
resembles all from which I have had to part: persons and above all things. In 
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We choose to recognize, in Benjamin’s quote, not criticism’s 
resolution but its dissolution, understanding the German thinker from a 
poststructuralist perspective.9 
Consequently, the importance of Schlegel’s irony consists in 
highlighting the creative, self-destructive power it has. Such a two-faced 
reading code, evident in Lucinde as we see in de Man’s analysis, operates 
in the instance of the disappearance of the limits of discourse. De Man 
defines Schlegel’s interruption-through-irony as anacoluthon, which 
continues in post-Romantic literature, in the lovers of art’s ruins. De 
Man states that expresses an ironic structure anacoluthon:
Nor can we hope to map it out as one topos among 
topoi, as would be the case with regular tropes of 
substitution. It is possible to find, in the terminology 
of rhetoric, terms that come close to designating such 
disruptions (e.g., parabasis or anacoluthon), which 
designate the interruption of a semantic continuum in 
a manner that lies beyond the power of reintegration. 
One must realize at once, however, that this disruption 
is not topical, that it cannot be located in a single 
point—since it is indeed the very notion of point, the 
geometrical zero,13 that is being dislodged—but that it 
is all-pervading. The anacoluthon is omnipresent, or, in 
the things I no longer have, he resides. He makes them transparent” (Bloom, 
1979: 31). For Bloom, Benjamin’s “aura” is the Sublime’s light, “truly visible 
only in the shock of its disappearance, the flight of its repression” (Bloom, 1979: 
31). However, poets try to avoid the abyss; all of them hesitate at the threshold. 
Poetic image is like a face reflected from mirror to mirror, in some way it fades 
or melts away, in each reflection becoming weaker. Finally, deconstruction or 
the antithetical critic must oppose abysses of deconstruction to a super mimesis 
reached through an art not exclusively limited to language, as there is always 
something more than language.
9  Poststructuralist interpretation of early German romanticism can be 
compared to the objections posed by Manfred Frank and Andrew Bowie. Both 
criticise the interpretation of the disappearance of subjectivity as organizing 
principle, that is why irony does not represent the possibility of annihilation 
of the id. See Frank, M. (2004); as the critics to the poststructuralist movement, 
that Frank calls Neostructuralism (1984) Was ist Neoestructuralism?; also Andrew 
Bowie (2003) and (1997). 
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temporal terms and in Friedrich Schlegel´s deliberately 
unintelligible formulation, the parabasis is permanent. 
Calling this structure ironic can be more misleading 
than helpful, since irony, like zero, is a term that is not 
susceptible to nominal or real definition. To say then, 
as we are actually saying, that allegory (as sequential 
narration) is the trope of irony (as the one is the trope 
of zero) is to say something that is true enough but not 
intelligible, which also implies that it cannot be put to 
work as a device of textual analysis (De Man, 1996: 61).
In fact, knowledge through ruins makes knowledge advance to 
a progress, incomprehensible–in the least–for rationality, latent for 
pleasure or displeasure for aesthetic experience. Romantic art criticism, 
following Benjamin, aims for the realization of two antagonistic postures 
(dogmatism and skepticism), not epistemologically–as in Kant and his 
criticism, but as aesthetic synthesis.
Romantic criticism is focused on the relations of the work of art with 
the rest of the works of art, and with the idea of art expressed in it. 
Thus, Romantic criticism’s task is, on the one hand, busy with trying to 
avoid putting the work forward for trial, and on the other, to dissolve–in 
the sense of a movement–the critical sense immanent in it. That is why 
“criticism in its central intention is not judgment but, on the work and, 
on the other hand, its resolution in the absolute. Both of these processes 
coincide in the end […]” (Benjamin, 1996: 159). 
However, it is important to note that de Man, at the end of his lecture 
on irony does not believe in the possibility that Benjamin offers about 
building from the ruins. This Demanian seal on irony radicalizes his 
approach by holding that irony destroys everything, including the story 
that ciphers the protection of speeches. In de Man’s words: 
Any expectation that one may have that deconstruction 
might be able to construct is suspended by such a 
passage, which is very strictly a pre-Nietzschean 
passage, heralding exactly “Uber Wahrheit und Luge”. 
Any attempt to construct—that is, to narrate—on no 
matter how advanced a level, is suspended, interrupted, 
disrupted, by a passage like this. As a result, it also 
makes it very difficult to conceive of a historiography, a 
system of history, that would be sheltered from irony. 
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Friedrich Schlegel’s interpreters have all felt this, which 
is why all of them, including Kierkegaard, have to invoke 
history as hypostasis as a means of defense against this 
irony. Irony and history seem to be curiously linked to 
each other (1996; 184).
This approach finds a constellation close to the reflections of De Man 
on the operation of anacoluthon in Rousseau at the end of Allegories of 
Reading. In the Confessions, De Man reads a way to disrupt and interrupt 
the speech, pointing identical to the one pointed by Schlegel as parekbasis. 
Such disruption is so extreme that it produces a dismantling of all forms 
of cognition of the understanding, reaching aesthetic aberration.     
III
Recovering Schlegel’s, Benjamin’s, Bloom’s and de Man’s 
reflections has the intention of questioning the unsurpassable limits 
between poetry-literature and critical-philosophical discipline. In 
the Romantics, this was already expressed through the nostalgia of 
the world’s dismemberment sensed by poets and artists. Neither the 
first Romanticism’s insistence upon gathering all the genres in one 
undifferentiated all-containing unit is random, nor is the use of the 
novel as tool for this is. Schlegel remembers, in Lyceum’s 60th fragment, 
how pointless a distinction between genres is, “All the classical poetical 
genres have now become ridiculous in their rigid purity” (Schlegel, 
1991: 8). This supposes understanding how narratives, tropological 
systems, are a marionette dance destined to catastrophe. De Man and 
Bloom perceive Romanticism’s fateful anticipation: every tropological 
system is a dance of the dead, of objects lost with each step taken, and 
their loss is, precisely, what makes them so delightful. Benjamin’s and 
de Man’s contributions to the potential of irony as criticism assume the 
placing, in the philosophical discussion, of a disruptive element intrinsic 
to every narrative, even to the philosophical narrative, as it is caught by 
the universe of literary forms derived from the novel.10
10  In Lyceum’s 65th fragment, he holds: «Poetry is republican speech: a 
speech which is its own law and end unto itself, and in which all the parts are 
free citizens and have the right to vote» (Schlegel, 1991: 8). In another, the 117th, 
he will say that poetry is criticism only for poetry. It is devoid of rules and lays, it 
is strength, that is why Schlegel is against a theory or concept of poetic genre in 
this fragment. In 117th we can see how poetry can be criticised by poetry, which 
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It is in the novel where the critical reflection is expressed at its utmost, 
its divine confusion of the forms does not only provoke the explosion of 
the philosophical model but it also destroys every genre standard. There 
is no difference between Romantic poetry (novel) and irony; according 
to Schlegel they are both destined to the destruction of the form, none of 
them is ever completed. Their quintessential critical act is, precisely, the 
energy of destruction. Rebellion as to discourses having an absolute and 
determined form is interrupted by irony (Hegel’s fear in Aesthetics), that 
is why, when intervening in philosophy as criticism, it is breaking with 
the philosophical form and, at the same time, it has to disappear with it. 
Its death is preannounced when the action happens.11
Like the aesthete, the dandy and the flâneur in their attitude of 
resignation, irony as a critical instance disappears by destroying itself, 
while at the same time it progresses to an indeterminate infinite of the 
accounts for the artist coming back on himself, using his work as a mirror that 
looks at itself, destroying itself as a medusa. Such a characterization of criticism 
is what Benjamin understands that overcomes traditional critical model, which 
needs a model outside the work of art. In this case, criticism is immanent and 
the artist anticipates in the work itself his criticism as self-reflection, showing 
consciousness of the production, usually unconscious. Precisely, that is the 
sense of irony as critical model or form.
11 Menke holds Schlegel’s irony is given by a theory of the presentation 
where the product cannot be shown if it simultaneously does not show what 
produces it. Menke, in his analysis of tragedy, points out that Schlegel favours 
a theory of presentation in which reflection always is self-reflection, as “[...] 
permitting Schlegel the step from philosophy to poetry, reads that a performance 
or portrayal is ‘transcendental’ when it presents ‘that which produces along with 
the product’. The self-reflection of presentation occurs as the ‘co-presentation’ 
of that which produces or conditions, of that which presents in that which is 
presented. [...] That self-reflection is constitutive for tragedy implies not only 
that there is no tragedy in which a co-presentation of its form does not also occur, 
but furthermore that tragedy first comes about through the co-presentation of its 
form; that in tragedy the tragic quality of the presented content has its basis in 
the co- presentation of its form [...]” (Menke, 2009: 46). In Aesthetics and Negativity 
[Spanish version Estética y Negatividad] as well as in Tragic Play, Menke warns 
us that Schlegel’s thought is pierced by self-reflection, co-presentation and co-
representation. Aesthetic subjectivity derived from Schlegel’s conception of 
irony is, in Menke’s view, a presentation of a product showing its presentation 
conditions while presenting itself. Subjectivity, in this case, has the possibility of 
becoming self-reflective and thus, critical of its presuppositions. 
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forms (novel). Irony and the lovers of ruins sustain an aesthetization 
of life capable of recovering artistic experience. This parallelism, then, 
shares the paradoxical and oscillating situation of a “[…] capacity of 
abandoning itself to the most selfless contemplation, as to the most 
participant action […]” (Givone, 2009, 151). Their criticism is never 
complete, the reason why the Romantics find in the novel the possibility 
of a criticism intrinsic to the work of art itself (criticality). The key 
moment of irony that we try to put at stake here is an ad infinitum 
revision of the limits, given that its reflection is driven to an absent 
absolute. The presence of this absolute only represents a heartbreaking 
escape never to reach a definite form, it is “[…] always an institution 
and constitution of its form, creation of a form, formation, Bildung or 
Gestaltung” (Sánchez Meca, 2013: 239). In other words, this criticism is a 
formation of the forms never to be closed or concluded.
Early Romantic criticism intends to build the parameters for 
artwork criticism from the work itself. Schlegel points out, in Athenäum’s 
238th fragment: “this poetry should describe itself, and always be 
simultaneously poetry and the poetry of poetry” (Schlegel, 1971: 195). 
Criticism is inherent to the work of art, that which Benjamin calls 
criticality (Kritisierbarkeit). With this concept, he tries to evoke the critical 
germ present in the object or the artwork. There is a latency, a kind of 
demand coming from the work. That is why Romantic criticism is not 
transcendental, something beyond the work, but transcendental poetry. 
Because, as Schlegel used to say, poetry (the work) and philosophy 
(criticism, reflection) come together in one genre: the novel. 
Criticism in early Romanticism supposes a counter-hegemonic 
element of the illustrated Modern world that tried to set these spheres 
apart and make them distinguishable from each other. Poetry and 
criticism, from a theological standpoint (the historical theology present in 
Romanticism), belong to prophetic work, as the possibility of combining 
creation with salvation. Inside the prophetic work, art and philosophy are 
the same one and only sacred will. However, Modernity has secularized 
the prophetic work elements relying on criticism (philosophy) for the 
task of salvation, while on art for creation. Considering Agamben, we 
find that religious tradition, secularized by the Modern world, has lost 
its historical and conceptual memory in relation to the intimate bond 
existing between art (work of creation) and criticism (work of salvation), 
both united in the prophetic work. Agamben writes:
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Hence the complicated and almost schizophrenic 
character that seems to mark this relationship. Once, 
the poet knew how to account for his poetry (“To open 
it through prose,” as Dante puts it), and the critic was 
also a poet. Now, the critic has lost access to the work 
of creation and thus gets revenge by presuming to 
judge it, while the poet no longer knows how to save 
his own work and thus discounts this incapacity by 
blindly consigning himself to the frivolity of the angel 
(Agamben 2011: 5).
The poet’s strength is evident in his possibility of fusing criticism 
and poetry. His aesthetic strength is the living paradox that makes 
the infinitely diverse and proteiform possible. We can say, then, that 
philosophical criticism sprung from early German Romanticism consists 
in expressing that the function of the artistic form is to turn into truthful 
contents, of a philosophical character, the factual contents, of a historical 
essence, which constitute the cornerstone of every meaningful work. 
When turning the factual contents in truthful contents there is a price to 
be paid: loss, fall; this makes the lack of effectiveness suffered by a work 
of art, due to its internal negativity, the starting point to a regeneration. 
The Romantic concept of criticism, as Benjamin sustains, is a radically 
esoteric, mysterious and secret one. 
This pleasure of the contradictive, the paradoxical, the discordant 
and absurd, revealed in the aesthetizing attitude of the Romantic 
triad of musical creatures, is a taste cultivated also by modern and 
contemporary authors–from Nietzsche to Blanchot–,who decide to build 
an a-systematic work in order to grow either several articles atomized 
in different genres, or only one that contains all of them. In this sense, 
Schlegel’s figure exalts this suspension of coherence. His portrait, as 
Blanchot well studies it in The Infinite Conversation, is representative of the 
contradiction and the paradox accompanying every early movement in 
Romanticism. His youth writings, as Lucinde and On incomprehensibility, 
are completely different from his later support of Catholicism, the Holy 
Allegiance and the Conservative reform of Metternich, or his work for 
Europa magazine. Blanchot places in Romanticism a tension between 
its authentic features and those less important, simultaneously a part 
of its inherent contradiction. In general, the author thinks the authentic 
features of early Romanticism are:
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[…] to consider the taste for religion accidental and the 
desire for revolt essential; to consider the concern with 
the past episodic and the refusal of tradition, the appeal 
to the new, and the consciousness of being modern 
as determinant; to consider nationalist penchants as a 
momentary trait and as decisive the pure subjectivity 
that has no fatherland (Blanchot, 1993 352).
All these features, taken as necessary traits for the characterization 
of Romanticism, do not indicate its complete definition or description. 
On the contrary, they signal another feature, better, its most sensible 
need: contradiction, the desire of opposing, its conscious break, anyway, 
the experience of contradiction. This, for Blanchot, is the confirmation 
of the “vocation of disorder–menace for some, promise for others, and 
for still others, futile threat or sterile promise” (Blanchot, 1993, 352). The 
possibility of finding oneself in any of these perspectives is the product 
of approaching Romanticism either from its initial intentions or from 
its results, if we can speak of a product of such process. This is why the 
younger Schlegel is the ultimate expression of Romanticism’s internal 
contradiction. In his own figure, the contradicting and less coherent 
symbol of the aspects irradiated from Romanticism incarnates. In one 
and the same person, in a brief period, two antagonistic expressions 
coexist, almost to forget each other, or to try to make each other pervade 
in an eternal dream. Blanchot describes Schlegel:
Friedrich Schlegel is the symbol of such vicissitudes: 
as a young man, he is an atheist, a radical, and an 
individualist. The freedom of spirit he displays, the 
intellectual richness and fantasy that each day lead him 
to invent new concepts, not irreflectively but in the high 
tension of a consciousness that wants to understand 
what it is discovering, are surprising to Goethe himself 
–who feels less intelligent, less learned and free than 
those Wieland names “the proud seraphim”, and who 
feels grateful to know he is honored by them. Some 
years pass: the same Schlegel, converted to Catholicism, 
a diplomat and journalist in the service of Metternich, 
surrounded by monks and pious men of society, is 
no longer anything but a fat philistine of unctuous 
speech, lazy, empty, his mind on food, and incapable 
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of remembering the young man who had written: “A 
single absolute law: the free spirit always triumphs over 
nature (1993: 352).
The vicissitudes referred to by Blanchot is the strange, surprising 
oscillation made when at the end of his youth he converts to Catholicism. 
The fragmentary character of his first studies is a direct opposite to his 
conservative religious spirit after conversion. Blanchot questions himself 
upon the authenticity of these moments, but recognizes this unsolvable 
situation, full of questions for him, is a feature of Romanticism. 
Schlegel, in his paradoxical figure, incarnates, characterizing it, poetry 
as a renovation project through contradiction and the power gained by 
overcoming obstacles, which are still present in thought patterns. 
This is why we insist on how the function of criticism is oriented 
towards the interrupted or split character of objects. It does not make 
any effort towards a solid comment from previously set categories; there 
is criticism only when it decides to renounce. Thus, irony demands the 
reader to identify not only the constant explosion of the principle of 
literary resolution –hoping to fulfill the expectations for the genre–, or the 
promised end of a tale, but the need to be accepted as the most satisfying 
rhetorical and aesthetic expression of identifying the contradictions in 
the world, in the art and in the literature.12
12  Ernst Behler, in Irony and Discourse of Modernity says something similar 
to Schlegel’s considerations on poetry and modernity: “Modern poetry, however, 
is in a permanent state of becoming”, and he adds that this “in fact, is its real 
essence: that it should forever be becoming and never be perfected.” Modern 
or romantic poetry “can be exhausted by no theory and only a divinatory 
criticism would dare try to characterize its ideal” (FS, 2:182-83; LF, 175). This 
infinite becoming, irreducible to a knowable principle with regard to beginning 
and end, seems to express Schlegel’s notion of history most concisely and also 
best represents the state of an accomplished modernity, fully conscious of its 
separation from classical perfection and equally distant from any utopian goal 
of accomplishment. Schlegel illustrated his self-reflective modernism in a great 
variety of ways, one of which was his frequent use of formulas such as “not yet” 
or “as long as.” Thus, he justifies fragmentary writing “as long as” we have not 
yet established the completed system of knowledge, or he demands irony “as 
long as in oral or written dialogues we philosophize not yet fully in systematic 
fashion” (F5,2:152)” (Behler, 1990: 60-61).
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We could, to put an end to our characterization of the critical spirit 
of Romanticism in irony and the three creatures proposed as analogous, 
state, as Massimo Cacciari, “that it is this renouncement, at the same 
time a development, the matter of contemporary ‘thinking poetry’” 
(Cacciari, 2000: 148). Criticism, in its Romantic and ironic sense, is 
focused on dissolving the form to distort the fragmentary work into an 
absolute work of art, that is, romanticize it. Analogously, irony, far from 
representing a simple subjective frivolity of the author, destroys the form 
by assimilating the contingent work to the absolute (from the finite to the 
infinite). Far from being considered an arbitrary decision of the subject, 
as it has been interpreted by Romantic criticism, irony keeps an objective 
component. It is not a coincidence that Socratic irony is for Schlegel a 
constant reference in his Fragments when characterizing irony. Perhaps 
this aspect was not taken into account by Kierkegaard in his work The 
Concept of Irony,13 when he asserts, following Hegel, that Romantic 
irony falls into the isolation of pure, subjective irony. According to the 
Danish author, the Romantic ironist, in his search for aesthetic freedom, 
renounces community and ethical values, becoming an individual 
isolated from collective productions.  Although in Kierkegaard’s work 
elements properly Romantic can be found, in the second part of his work, 
particularly in thesis XI, aesthetic irony is put at the service of ethics 
(Recentior ironia inprimis ad ethicen revocanda est). Therefore, so as to avoid 
irony’s supposedly subjective and frivolous character, Kierkegaard 
opposes to it Socrates’ ethical world, disregarding that Schlegel himself 
does not cease to refer to him when he characterizes irony.14 Precisely, 
13  See Kierkegaard, S. (1989). 
14  Hegel and his inheritors, e.g. Kierkegaard, will qualify early Romantics 
–Schlegel, specifically–, as authors whose spirits are full of frivolity. Later, Carl 
Schmitt will signal all early Romantic thinkers as autistic to reality, devoid 
of commitment and deaf due to their foolish irresponsibility. Cfr. Schmitt, 
C. (1986). Karl H. Bohrer has characterized these authors as the tradition 
that questions Romanticism as a subjectivist movement under the name of 
“Romantic criticism”. This tradition will extend from Hegel to Schmitt, going 
through Heine, Kierkegaard and Lukács. All these authors shall coincide in 
identifying the Romantic movement as a mere subjectivism reducing everything 
to nothing, without taking the objects seriously. Bohrer starts by observing 
that in Romantic criticism an ethical imputation to Romantic aesthetic would 
cipher, for the first time, as the artist would play with the materials without 
any responsibility. This criticism, according to Bohrer, would try to penalize 
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the work of critical irony, as explained by Benjamin, is to recover that 
objective dimension art has. Walter Benjamin explains: “Hence, in this 
kind of irony, which arises from the relation to the unconditioned, it is 
a question not of subjectivism and play but of the assimilation of the 
limited work to the absolute, of its complete objectivization at the price 
of its ruin” (Benjamin: 1996, 164).
It is in the inconsistence where the aesthetic taste for ruin emerges. 
The three Romantic figures take this critical masquerade as a way 
of life or an attitude to it. The Bohemian triad make of irony their 
pleasure and delight, and they build on it an artistic premise that can 
be identified from early Romanticism to young Nietzsche, Blanchot and 
Surrealism. This road, reconfiguring a mandate intrinsic to their nature, 
intends to demonstrate how life itself is already artistic. Actually, they 
comply with the intuitive sanction of the prophet Novalis “world must 
become a fable”, something Nietzsche saw realized in the spectacle of 
his eyes: “the world is a fable”. This instability and confusion is what 
poststructuralist deconstruction understands in irony as the signifier’s 
free play, because “For Deconstruction, irony is nor a trope but finally 
is, as Paul de Man says, ‘the systematic undoing ... of understanding’ 
[…]” (Bloom, 1979: 4). Irony interrupts narration as well as the id’s story 
(the history of subjectivity) until it makes the id disappear: this is the 
tropological system where thought, language, history and culture move. 
This progress of complex elements is contaminated by the poetics of the 
destruction of the forms. In this critical act, finally, forms are eventually 
the possibility of the autonomy in art in favour of an element external to art 
proper. A usual target to this criticism to aesthetic irony is, precisely, Romantic 
irony. Faced with that criticism, Bohrer holds that it is not a coincidence that 
Schlegel, when referring to irony, alludes to Socrates. Socratic philosophy, in 
Bohrer’s analysis, would offer the Romantic youngster the power to characterize 
irony under the objectivist features that would give it autonomy from the artist’s 
subjectivist arbitrariness, different from Kierkegaard, who opposes Schlegel’s 
irony to Socrates’ philosophic irony. The “logical beauty”, “logical enthusiasm”, 
“novels are the Socratic dialogues of our times”, “sublime urbanity”, all these 
references from Schlegel pointed at Socrates, would make it possible to connect 
his aesthetic theory with an operation that subsumes philosophy and thought to 
aesthetics. Bohrer makes efforts to find, not only in Schlegel now, but also in all 
the aesthetic tradition, a way of distinguishing it and emphasizing the aesthetic 
outside the criteria of philosophical-historical thought, stating that which he 
calls “artistic-literary criticism” See Bohrer, K.H. (1989).  
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de-mystified. That is reason enough for this debate not to be closed. 
Subjectivity cannot play safe in it interiority, or in Modernity’s desolate 
world, it prevails as irony. 
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